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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction to decide this appeal 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §78-2a-3(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
I. WHETHER THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT 
THE PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANTS ENTERED INTO AN ORAL 
AGREEMENT TO SELL THE 1986 KENWORTH TRACTOR TO DEFENDANT 
KROGMAN. 
II. WHETHER THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING 
THAT THE ALLEGED ORAL AGREEMENT WAS NOT BARRED BY UTAH'S 
STATUTE OF FRAUDS. 
III. WHETHER THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING 
THE PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT. 
STATUTES WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS 
DETERMINATIVE OR SIGNIFICANT 
Section 25-5.4. Certain agreements void unless 
written and signed. The following agreements are void 
unless the agreement, or some note or memorandum of the 
agreement, is in writing, signed by the party to be 
charged with the agreement: 
(1) every agreement that by its terms is not to be 
performed within one year from the making of the 
agreement; 
(2) every promise to answer for the debt, default, 
or miscarriage of another. 
Section 25-5-8. Right to specific performance not 
affected. Nothing in this chapter contained shall be 
construed to abridge the powers of courts to compel the 
specific performance of agreements in case of part 
performance thereof. 
Rule 52. Findings by the court. 
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts 
without a jury or with an advisory jury, the court shall 
find the facts specially and state separately its 
conclusions of law thereon, and judgment shall be entered 
pursuant to Rule 58A; in granting or refusing 
interlocutory injunctions the court shall similarly set 
forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which 
constitute the grounds of its actions. Requests for 
findings are not necessary for purposes of review. 
Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary 
evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly 
erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the 
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility 
of the witnesses. The finds of a master, to the extent 
that the court adopts them, shall be considered as the 
findings of the court. It will be sufficient if the 
findings of fact and conclusions of law are stated orally 
and recorded in open court following the close of the 
evidence or appear in an opinion or memorandum of 
decision filed by the court. The trial court need not 
enter findings of fact and conclusions of law in rulings 
on motions, except as provided in Rule 41(b). The court 
shall, however, issue a brief written statement of the 
ground for its decision on all motions granted under Rule 
12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 59 when the motion is based 
on more than one ground. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On February 15, 1991, prior to the oral 
agreement between Plaintiff Donohue and Defendant 
2 
Krogman, Plaintiff Donohue entered into a written lease 
agreement with Mr. Mouille, d/b/a U.S. Load Services, for 
the lease of a 1986 Kenworth Truck. (Appellant's 
Addendum "D"). 
2. That lease agreement required Mr. Mouille to pay 
$1,000.00 per month to Associates Commercial Corporation 
directly and to pay Plaintiff Donohue $500.00 per month. 
(Appellant's Addendum "D", Paragraph 2). 
3. Defendant Krogman was not a party to said 
Agreement, did not execute said Agreement, and never saw 
the written Agreement. (Transcript, p. 163; Defendant 
Krogmanfs Deposition, p. 21-23) (Appellee's Addendum 
"A"). 
4. Mr. Mouille leased the truck from Plaintiff 
Donohue until December of 1991, when he informed 
Plaintiff Donohue that he was closing down U.S. Load 
Services (Transcript, p. 93). 
5. In December of 1991, Plaintiff Donohue told Mr. 
Mouille that he was not in the financial position to pay 
for the remaining 17-18 months payments on the truck and 
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that he would consider any option that Mr. Mouille 
suggested. (Transcript, p. 93). 
6. Consequently, Mr. Mouille contacted Defendant 
Krogman about purchasing Plaintiff DonohueTs truck. 
(Transcript, p. 94). 
7. The parties scheduled a meeting between 
Plaintiff Donohue, Defendant Krogman and Mr. Mouille at 
Mr. Mouille's parents' house. (Transcript, p. 95). 
8. The meeting took place at the very first part of 
January of 1992. (Transcript, p. 95). 
9. The sole purpose of the meeting was to discuss 
the possibility of Defendant Krogman purchasing Plaintiff 
Donohue's truck. (Transcript, pp. 95-96). 
10. During the meeting, Plaintiff Donohue and 
Defendant Krogman entered into a verbal agreement, under 
which, Defendant Krogman agreed to take over the truck as 
of the 15th of January, and to make all remaining 
payments on the truck. (Transcript, pp. 96 & 153).1 
I 
On direct examination, Mr. Mouille testified that during the 
meeting at his parents' house the following was said and 
understood by the parties: 
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11. The parties agreed that once Defendant Krogman 
paid off the truck, Plaintiff Donohue would give him the 
title to the truck. (Transcript, p. 104). 
12. At the meeting, Plaintiff Donohue never 
addressed the $500.00 monthly payment made by Mr. Mouille 
to Plaintiff Donohue under the 1991 lease agreement. 
(Transcript, p. 97).2 
13. The terms of the contract were as follows: 
Defendant Krogman would make the remaining $1,000.00 
monthly payments to Associates through Mr. Mouille, who 
"Q. (By Mr. Skeen). Tell me, as near as you 
can recall, who said what. 
A. Mr. Krogman was just acknowledging the 
discussion that John Donohue and we were 
having in front of Vern. We would have made 
this verbal, gentlemen's agreement. 
Consequently, the only function that the deal 
was, that Vern Krogman was going to take over 
the truck as of the 15th of January. He would 
have had to pay a half payment and then every 
remaining payment." (Transcript, p. 96). 
At trial, Mr. Mouille gave the following testimony: 
Q. During that meeting, did Mr. Donohue ever say, well, 
wait a minute, what about my additional 500 per month you 
owe me? Ever raise that as an issue? 
A. No. Never did." (Transcript, p. 97). 
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was Plaintiff Krogman's agent. (Transcript, pp. 97 & 
154-155).3 Once the final installment was made on the 
Kenworth, Plaintiff Donohue would turn the title over to 
Defendant Krogman. (Transcript, p, 156). 
14. Defendant Krogman took possession of the truck 
on January 3, 1992, and ran the truck until December 21, 
1992. (Transcript, pp. 156-157). 
3 
Mr. Mouille testified that pursuant to the meeting at his 
parents' house, the additional terms of the oral agreement 
between the Plaintiff and Defendant were to be as follows: 
"Q. (By Mr. Skeen) Tell me, as near as you 
can recall, who said what. 
A. . . . [T]he only two requests made by John 
Donohue was that the truck had to be — remain 
under my control because John didn't know 
Vern's address or his residence. And the 
other request, that I had to make sure the 
payment was made through my company since 
deducted out of the settlement was those two 
conditions were met. That was requirement. 
Q. Now, when you say these two conditions and 
you were to be in control, and payments were 
to be made through you? 
A. Right. 
Q. Those were at the request of Donohue, were 
they not? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Because Mr. Krogman didn't care who 
collected the money? 
A. Mr. Krogman didn't care, but this was the 
only requirement, Mr. Krogman agreed to go 
along with it." (Transcript, pp. 96-97). 
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15. During the period of purchase, Defendant 
Krogman made payments on the truck totalling $17,263.29 
together with all repairs, maintenance, licensing, 
insurance, and all other necessities required by the 
truck, satisfying the terms of the oral agreement to 
purchase the 1986 Kenworth truck from Plaintiff Donohue. 
(Transcript, pp. 153, 156 & 164). 
16. Pursuant to the oral agreement between 
Plaintiff Donohue and Defendant Krogman, Plaintiff 
Donohuefs and Mr. Mouillefs attorney, John K. Rice, was 
contacted about drafting a separate written agreement 
between Plaintiff Donohue and Defendant Krogman. 
(Transcript Supplement, p. 4). 
17. Attorney Rice drew up a written agreement 
memorializing the oral agreement between Plaintiff 
Donohue and Defendant Krogman on March 30, 1992. 
(Transcript Supplement, p. 7). 
18. Prior to drafting the agreement, Mr. Rice spoke 
to both Mr. Mouille and Defendant Krogman regarding the 
agreement. (Transcript Supplement, p. 6). 
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19. Mr. Rice then discussed the agreement with 
Plaintiff Donohue and that, at that time, Plaintiff 
Donohue was willing to enter into the agreement. 
(Transcript Supplement, p. 6). 
20. Mr. Rice also drew up a separate agreement 
between Plaintiff Donohue and Mr. Mouille, d/b/a Haul-A-
Way Transport, Inc., under which, Mr. Mouille remained 
obligated to pay Plaintiff Donohue $9,500 which he owed 
under the February 15, 1991, lease agreement. 
(Transcript Supplement, pp. 5 & 11). 
21. Mr. Rice testified that Mr. Mouille agreed to 
remain solely liable to pay Mr. Donohue the $500.00 per 
month and that the $9,500 debt owed by Mr. Mouille to Mr. 
Donohue would not affect whether Defendant Krogman would 
get the title to the truck once he paid off Associates. 
(Transcript Supplement, p. 5). 
22. Contrary to the testimony given by Plaintiff 
Donohue, Mr. Rice testified that he conversed with 
Plaintiff Donohue regarding the continued amount owed by 
Mr. Mouille. (Transcript Supplement, pp. 6 & 11). 
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23. From January of 1992, until December of 1993, 
Mr. Mouille withheld $1,000.00 per month from the monies 
owed by him to Defendant Krogman and then paid $1,000.00 
directly to Associates pursuant to the installment 
contract. (Transcript, p. 97). 
24. In February, 1993, Defendant Krogman contacted 
Mr. Mouille and asked for a payoff on the truck. 
(Transcript, p. 105). 
25. Mr. Mouille then called Plaintiff Donohue, 
requesting the same information. (Transcript, p. 105). 
26. Plaintiff Donohue called Associates and 
reported to Mr. Mouille that the sum of $5,763.29 was 
owing on the truck. (Transcript, p. 158). 
27. After Mr. Mouille contacted Defendant Krogman 
and advised him of the payoff figure, Defendant Krogman 
forwarded a cashier's check to Mr. Mouille, d/b/a Haul-
A-Way Transport, Inc., for payment in full of the 
outstanding balance on the truck. (Transcript, p. 105 & 
158). 
28. Mr. Mouille did not use the money to pay off 
the truck at that time but continued to make the 
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$1,000.00 monthly payments on the truck during the months 
of February through June, 1993, from the proceeds of the 
cashier's check. (Transcript, pp. 105-106). 
29. In July, 1993, Mr. Mouille contacted Plaintiff 
Donohue and told Plaintiff Donohue that he was prepared 
to make the last payment on the truck to Associates. 
(Transcript, pp. 106-107). 
30. He reminded Plaintiff Donohue that he would 
need the Kenworth title to transfer to Defendant Krogman. 
(Transcript, p. 107). 
31. Plaintiff Donohue obtained the $1,065.00 pay-
off figure from Associates and called Mr. Mouille, 
informing him of the pay-off figure. (Transcript, p 
107). 
32. When Mr. Mouille told Plaintiff Donohue that he 
had the money to pay off the truck to release the title 
to Defendant Krogman, Plaintiff Donohue, for the first 
time, told Mr. Mouille that he would not transfer the 
title to Defendant Krogman as Mr. Mouille still owed 
Plaintiff Donohue money. (Transcript, p. 107). 
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33. Mr. Mouille advised the Plaintiff that the 
truck was not negotiable and that it belonged to 
Defendant Krogman. (Transcript, p. 107). 
34. Based upon Plaintiff Donohuefs representation 
that he would not tender the title of the truck to 
Defendant Krogman, Mr. Mouille refused to pay the last 
installment, in the sum of $1,065.00, to Associates. 
Transcript, p. 77). 
35. In, or before, September, 1993, Defendant 
Krogman called Plaintiff Donohue and demanded the title 
to the truck, pursuant to the contract. (Transcript, p. 
159). 
36. At that time, Plaintiff Donohue refused to 
tender the title to Defendant Krogman and demanded return 
of the Kenworth truck. (Transcript, p. 159). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The District Court correctly found that an oral 
agreement existed between the parties to sell the 1986 
Kenworth truck to Defendant Krogman. Furthermore, the 
District Court's four findings of fact regarding the 
existence of an oral contract are supported by 
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substantial and competent evidence that a meeting of the 
minds occurred between the Plaintiff and the Defendant. 
Moreover, manifestations of assent between the parties, 
that were in themselves sufficient to conclude a 
contract, will not prevent the contract's operation 
simply because the parties also manifested an intent to 
prepare and adopt a written memorial thereof. 
The oral agreement clearly is not barred by Utah's 
Statute of Frauds. The trial court specifically found 
that Defendant Krogman performed his part of the 
agreement in reliance on the parties' agreement. 
Furthermore, the Record conclusively shows that the oral 
agreement could have been performed within one year and 
that Defendant Krogman was not answering a debt for Mr. 
Mouille or Plaintiff Donohue. 
Therefore, the District Court properly dismissed the 
Plaintiff's Complaint and correctly found that an oral 
agreement existed between the parties. Appellee 
respectfully requests that this Court affirm the District 
Court's judgment for Appellee. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT THE 
PLAINTIFF 
ORAL 
AND 
CONTRACT 
THE 
TO 
DEFENDANT 
SELL THE 
ENTERED 
1986 
INTO 
KENWORTH 
A BINDING 
TRUCK TO 
DEFENDANT KROGMAN. 
A. Standard of Review 
On appeal, the decision of the trial court is 
entitled to a presumption of validity. Oberhansly v. 
Earl, 572 P.2d 1384, 1386 (Utah 1977). Utah appellate 
courts are required to view the evidence and any 
inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to 
sustaining the decision. Id. ; see also Cutler v. Bowen, 
543 P. 2d 1349 (Utah 1975). Furthermore, appellate courts 
will not overturn a trial court's factual findings when 
such findings are supported by substantial and competent 
evidence. Cambelt Int'l Corp. v. Dalton, 745 P.2d 1239, 
1242 (Utah 1987).; see also Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 P.2d 
766, 769 (Utah 1985). Substantial evidence is 
such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept 
as adequate to support a conclusion." Johnson-Bowles v. 
Division of Securities, 829 P.2d 101, 107 (Utah App. 
1992), cert, denied, 843 P.2d 516, quoting Idaho State 
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Ins. Fund v. Hunnicutt, 110 Idaho 257, 715 P.2d 927, 930 
(1985). The burden on an appellant in challenging the 
trial court's factual findings is heavy. Cambelt Int'l 
Corp., 745 P.2d at 1242. Thus, findings of fact, whether 
based upon oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set 
aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be 
given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the 
credibility of the witnesses. UT R. CIV. P. 52(a). 
Therefore, in reviewing the evidence presented at 
trial, this Court must view the evidence and any 
inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to 
sustain the District Court's decision. The District 
Court heard substantial and competent evidence that 
clearly supported its factual findings and legal 
conclusion that a contract existed between the Plaintiff 
14 
and the Defendant.4 The District Court's decision 
therefore must be affirmed unless clearly erroneous. 
B. Trial Court's Opportunity to Judge the 
Credibility of Witnesses 
It is a function of the judge, as the trier of fact, 
upon hearing oral testimony, to decide which evidence is 
more credible regarding the issues at trial. Lemon v. 
Coatesr 735 P.2d 58, 60 (Utah 1987). Moreover, a trial 
court's findings of the ultimate facts implicitly reflect 
consideration of the believability of the witnesses' 
testimony. McKlnstray v. McKinstrayf 628 P. 2d 1286 (Utah 
1981). Appellate courts may not disturb the trial 
judge's findings unless clearly erroneous. Lemon, 735 
P.2d at 60. 
4 
Plaintiff's bald assertion that the District Court's factual 
finding of the existence of an oral contract between the 
Plaintiff and the Defendant is contrary to the evidence 
presented at trial. Whether a contract exists between 
parties is a question of law reviewed for correctness, John 
Deere Co. v. A & H Equipment, Inc., 876 P.2d 880, 883 (Utah 
App. 1994). The District Court's factual findings that an 
oral contract existed were based on the clear and definite 
testimony of Mr. Mouille, the Defendant, and Mr. Rice. Thus, 
the District Court's factual findings cannot be overturned 
unless clearly erroneous. 
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The trial court judge heard testimony from numerous 
witnesses and had the opportunity to judge the 
credibility of the witnesses. Both Mr. Mouille and 
Defendant Krogman gave clear, unequivocal, and definite 
testimony of the existence of an oral agreement between 
the Plaintiff and the Defendant for the purchase of the 
1986 Kenworth truck. Moreover, Mr. Rice's testimony 
confirmed that Plaintiff Donohue understood the terms of 
the contract and assented to the terms. 
Appellant tenuously argues that Defendant Krogmanfs 
testimony was impeached because he failed remember the 
exact date, place, and time of the oral agreement.5 
This argument is merely an attempt to muddle the clearly 
5 
The evidence presented to the District Court clearly showed 
that an oral agreement between the Plaintiff and the Defendant 
arose at the meeting at Mr. Mouille?s parents' house. 
Although several more conversations between the Plaintiff, the 
Defendant, and Mr. Mouille occurred at the 
offices of Mr. Mouillefs corporation, Haul-A-Way Transport, 
Inc., in Bountiful, Utah, (Transcript, p. 98), both the 
Defendant and Mr. Mouille maintained that the parties entered 
into the oral agreement at Mr. Mouillefs parents1 house. At 
subsequent meetings, the Defendant inspected the truck, he and 
the Plaintiff talked about the different aspects of the truck, 
and the parties discussed the agreement even further. 
(Transcript, p. 98). 
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established facts. Defendant Krogman testified that he 
and the Plaintiff discussed the terms of the contract, 
including the purchase price of the truck. (Transcript, 
p. 156 ) 6. Defendant Krogman further testified that both 
parties understood the terms of the contract and that 
both parties assented to those terms. (Transcript, pp. 
155-156). Both Mr. Mouille and Mr. Rice corroborated 
Defendant Krogman's testimony regarding the existence of 
the oral agreement and its terms. 
The District Court Judge, as the trier of fact, 
heard testimony and decided which evidence was more 
credible regarding the issues at trial. Furthermore, the 
District Court's findings of the ultimate facts 
implicitly reflected consideration of the believability 
of the witnesses' testimony. Thus, this Court should not 
Defendant's testimony is consistent with the District 
Court's Finding of Facts: "7. The Court finds that while some 
of the specifics of the contract may not have been discussed 
in detail between the parties, sufficient terms were discussed 
and agreed upon to constitute a contract between the parties." 
(Record, pp. 172-173). 
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disturb the trial judge's findings unless clearly 
erroneous. 
C. Clear Meeting of the Mounds 
The District Court's four findings of fact 
regarding the existence of an oral contract are supported 
by substantial and competent evidence that a meeting of 
the minds occurred between the Plaintiff and the 
Defendant. It is a basic principle of contract law that 
there can be no contract without a meeting of the minds 
of the parties which must be spelled out either expressly 
or impliedly with sufficient definiteness to allow 
enforcement. Oberhansly, 572 P.2d at 1386. 
An "oral contract and its terms must be clear, 
definite, mutually understood, and established by clear, 
unequivocal and definite testimony." Holmgren Brothers, 
inc. v. Ballard, 534 P.2d 611, 614 (Utah 1975). 
Moreover, "contractual mutual assent requires assent by 
all the parties to the same thing in the same sense so 
that their minds meet as to all the terms." John Deere 
Co., v. A & H Equipment, Inc., 876 P.2d 880, 884 (Utah 
18 
App. 1994), quoting Crlsmon v. Western Co. of North 
America, 742 P.2d 1219 (Utah App. 1987). 
Here, the Record clearly establishes that the terms 
of the oral contract between the Plaintiff and the 
Defendant were clear, definite, and mutually understood. 
The Defendant, Mr. Mouille, and Mr. Rice gave clear, 
unequivocal, and definite testimony regarding the terms 
of the oral agreement and the parties1 mutual 
understanding of said agreement. 
As mentioned above, Mr. Mouille testified that he 
leased the truck from the Plaintiff until December of 
1991, when he informed the Plaintiff that he was closing 
down his business on December 15, 1991. (Transcript, p. 
93). Mr. Mouille then testified that Plaintiff Donohue 
told him that he could not afford to pay the remaining 
17-18 months payments on the truck, and therefore, Mr. 
Mouille approached Defendant Krogman about purchasing the 
truck from Plaintiff Donohue. (Transcript, pp. 93-94). 
Mr. Mouille testified that a meeting, between John 
Donohue, Vern Krogman and himself,took place at the very 
first part of January of 1992 at his parents' house. 
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(Transcript, p. 95). Mr. Mouille further testified that 
the sole purpose of the meeting was to discuss the 
purchase of the truck (Transcript, pp. 95-96). 
On direct examination, Mr. Mouille testified that 
during the meeting at his parents1 house, both the 
Plaintiff and the Defendant understood that the Defendant 
was going to take the truck and begin payments to 
Associates as of the 15th of January. (Transcript, p. 
96). Mr. Mouille testified that, at Plaintiff Donohuef s 
request, the additional terms of the oral agreement were 
that the truck had to remain under Mr. Mouillefs control 
and that Defendant Krogman had to make every remaining 
payment through Mr. Mouille?s company. (Transcript, pp. 
96-97). Mr. Mouille testified that Defendant Krogman 
agreed to the terms proposed by Plaintiff Donohue. 
(Transcript, p. 97). 
Defendant Krogman testified that, under the oral 
agreement, Plaintiff Donohue required him to pay 
$1,000.00 per month to Associates through Mr. Mouille 
until the truck was paid off. (Transcript, p. 154). 
Defendant Krogman also testified that the parties 
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understood that after he had made all of the payments 
through Mr, Mouille to Associates, that Plaintiff Donohue 
would give him the title to the truck, (Transcript, p. 
155). 
Furthermore, John Rice, Plaintiff DonohueTs 
attorney, testified that, pursuant to the oral agreement 
between Plaintiff Donohue and Defendant Krogman, he was 
contacted about drafting a separate written document, 
memorializing the oral agreement between Plaintiff 
Donohue and Defendant Krogman. (Transcript Supplement, 
p. 4). Mr. Rice also testified that he drew up a written 
agreement memorializing the oral agreement on March 30, 
1992. (Transcript Supplement, p. 7). 
Mr. Rice then testified that he spoke to both Mr. 
Mouille and Defendant Krogman regarding the agreement 
between the Plaintiff and the Defendant. (Transcript 
Supplement, p. 6). Mr. Rice further testified that he 
discussed the agreement with Plaintiff Donohue and that 
Plaintiff Donohue was willing to enter into the 
agreement. (Transcript Supplement, p. 6). Mr. Rice 
concluded his testimony by confirming that Plaintiff 
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Donohue had conversed with Mr. Mouille regarding the 
$9,500 debt and that the parties agreed that Mr. Mouille 
was to pay the $9,500. (Transcript Supplement, pp. 5, 7 
& 11). 
It is interesting to note that Mr. Rice drew up an 
entirely separate agreement between the Plaintiff and Mr. 
Mouille, under which, Mr. Mouille remained obligated to 
pay the Plaintiff $9,500 which he owed the Plaintiff 
under the February 15, 1991, lease agreement between the 
Plaintiff and Mr. Mouille. (Transcript Supplement, p. 
5). The fact that Mr. Rice was asked to prepare two 
separate documents is substantial and competent evidence 
that Plaintiff Donohue intended to enter into, and, in 
fact, had already entered into two separate agreements 
with Mr. Mouille and Defendant Krogman. 
Appellant argues that he had no input in drafting 
these documents and that the terms and conditions were 
supplied only by Mr. Mouille. This contention is without 
merit. As mentioned above, Mr. Rice testified that 
Plaintiff Donohue conversed with Mr. Mouille about the 
written agreement between Plaintiff Donohue and Defendant 
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Krogman and that he was willing to enter into said 
agreement. (Transcript Supplement, p. 7). Furthermore, 
Mr. Rice testified that he conversed with the Plaintiff 
regarding the new agreement between the Plaintiff and Mr. 
Mouille. (Transcript Supplement, p. 11). Finally, the 
Plaintiff informed Mr. Rice that, pursuant to the new 
agreement, Mr. Mouille would remain separately liable for 
the $9,500 resulting from the 1991 lease. (Transcript 
Supplement, p. 11). 
The District Court therefore properly found that an 
oral agreement existed between the Plaintiff and the 
Defendant for the purchase of the Kenworth truck. There 
was a clear meeting of the minds between the parties 
which was expressly understood with sufficient 
definiteness to require enforcement of the oral 
agreement. All parties knew that Defendant Krogman was 
to pay the remaining payments to Associates through Mr. 
Mouille and receive title to the truck when the payments 
were made. The parties also knew that Mr. Mouille was to 
separately pay Plaintiff Donohue $9,500. Furthermore, 
the oral contract and its terms were clear, definite, 
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mutually understood, and established by clear, 
unequivocal and definite testimony. Finally, the parties 
to the contract mutually assented to the same thing in 
the same sense so that their minds met as to all the 
terms. 
D. Sufficient Manifestations of Assent 
Appellant argues that the parties merely negotiated 
at the meeting at Mr. Mouillefs parents' house because 
the Plaintiff did not manifest a willingness to contract 
until the agreement was reduced to writing. The Supreme 
Court of Utah has recognized that "[m]anifestations of 
assent that are in themselves sufficient to conclude a 
contract will not be prevented from so operating by the 
fact that the parties also manifest an intention to 
prepare and adopt a written memorial thereof." SacJcler 
v. Savin, 267 U.A.R. 22, 24 (Utah 1995), (citing RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §27 (1981). The District Court's factual 
findings are consistent with the testimony given by 
Defendant Krogman, Mr. Mouille, and Mr. Rice that both 
Plaintiff Donohue and Defendant Krogman manifested assent 
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to contract regarding the sale of the Kenworth truck at 
the meeting at Mr. Mouille's parents' house. 
Plaintiff Donohue's assent was clearly manifested 
by: (1) allowing Defendant Krogman to drive the Kenworth 
truck for 16 months; (2) pursuant to Defendant Krogman?s 
request, Plaintiff Donohue called Associates for the pay-
off amount on the truck; (3) Plaintiff Donohue made no 
payments to Associates during the term of the contract 
between Plaintiff Donohue and Defendant Krogman; (4) 
Plaintiff Donohue did not pay any insurance, licensing 
fees, taxes, or maintenance on the truck during the 
period of the contract; (5) If no agreement existed, why 
didn't Plaintiff Donohue demand return of the truck at 
the outset?; (6) Finally, why didn't Plaintiff Donohue 
sue Mr. Mouille when Mr. Mouille stopped making the 
$1,500 per month payments due under the original 
agreement if no contract with Defendant Krogman existed? 
Plaintiff Donohue sat on his rights, allowing Defendant 
Krogman to make all payments to Associates, and then, 
only when Defendant Krogman fully performed his part of 
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the agreement, did Plaintiff Donohue disavow the 
contract. 
Appellant next argues that there must be a clear 
meeting of the minds before either a modification or 
novation of an existing contract occurs. See Provo City 
Corp., v. Nielson Scott Co., 603 P.2d 803 (Utah 1979). 
Appellant fails to recognize the existence of two 
separate contracts; one between the Plaintiff and Mr. 
Mouille, and one between the Plaintiff and Defendant 
Krogman. While there must be a meeting of the minds to 
modify an existing contract between the original 
contracting parties, the modification does not affect an 
entirely separate contract between one of the parties and 
a third party. 
In the present case, the contract between Plaintiff 
Donohue and Defendant Krogman was never modified, 
requiring a new meeting of the minds. Assuming, 
arguendo, as appellant contends, that the original 
agreement between Plaintiff Donohue and Mr. Mouille was 
never cancelled. It was clearly modified by the parties' 
conduct. Although not modified in writing, the original 
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agreement would still be enforceable outside of Utah's 
Statute of Frauds due to the doctrine of partial 
performance as discussed below. 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT 
THE ORAL AGREEMENT WAS NOT BARRED BY UTAH'S 
STATUTE OF FRAUDS. 
A. Standard of Review 
Factual Findings are upheld unless clearly erroneous 
and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the 
trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. 
Zions First Nat. Bank v. Nat. Am. Title Ins., 749 P.2d 
651, 653 (Utah 1988). Whether a contract exists between 
parties is a question of law reviewed for correctness. 
John Deere Co., 876 P.2d at 883. 
B
* Statute of Frauds 
Utah's Statute of Frauds, § 25-5-4 U.C.A. (1953), 
as amended, bars both oral agreements where, by their 
terms, cannot be performed within one year and oral 
agreements to answer for the debts of another. (Emphasis 
added). Notwithstanding Utah's Statute of Frauds, courts 
enforce oral agreements where one party has performed in 
reliance on the agreement. Martin v. Scholl, 678 P.2d 
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274, 275 (Utah 1983); see also 73 Am. Jur., Statute of 
Frauds, § 399. Furthermore, § 25-5-8 U.C.A. (1953) of 
the Utah Statute of Frauds provides: "Nothing in this 
chapter contained shall be construed to abridge the 
powers of courts to compel the specific performance of 
agreements in case of part performance thereof." Martin, 
678 P.2d at 275, quoting § 25-5-8 U.C.A. (1953). 
The Supreme Court of Utah outlined the following 
standard of sufficient part performance: 
First, the oral contract and its terms must 
be clear and definite; second the acts done in 
performance on the contract must be equally 
clear and definite; and third, the acts must 
be in reliance on the contract. Such acts in 
reliance must be such that (a) they would not 
have been performed had the contract not 
existed, and (b) the failure to perform on the 
part of the promisor would result in fraud on 
the performer who relied, since damages would 
be inadequate. Reliance may be made in 
innumerable ways, all of which could refer 
exclusively to the contract. 
Id., at 275, citing Randall v. Tracy Collins & Trust Co., 
6 Utah 2d 18, 23, 305 P.2d 480, 483 (Utah 1956); see 
also 2 Corbin on Contracts , § 425 (1950) (performance 
must be in pursuance of the contract and in reasonable 
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reliance thereon); 37 C.J.S., Statute of Frauds, § 250 
(1943) (part performance to be sufficient to take the 
case out of the statute must consist of clear and 
definite acts of the party relying thereon). 
As mentioned above, § 25-5-8 U.C.A. (1953), 
provides that part performance may remove a contract from 
the bar of the statute of frauds. Young v. Moore, 663 
P.2d 78, 80 (Utah 1983). "The doctrine of part 
performance in this State has not been confined to a 
fixed, inflexible formula." Id. In Holmgren Brothers, 
supra., the Court stated: 
The doctrine of part performance, in the 
State of Utah, has not been reduced to a 
formula . . . Thus, decisions of this court 
do not stay the hand of equity in the 
equitable situations created by oral contracts 
for the transfer of an interest in land, but 
the statute is preserved and remains to serve 
its purpose -- the prevention of fraud and 
injustice. 
Id. at 613-14. Furthermore, the statute of frauds has no 
application to fully executed contracts, and matters 
arising out of fully executed contracts may be enforced. 
Kerr v. Hillyard, 51 Utah 364, 170 P. 981 (1918); 
Greenwood v. Jackson, 102 Utah 161, 128 P.2d 282 (1942). 
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In the present case, Plaintiff Donohue and Defendant 
Krogman entered into an oral agreement whereby Defendant 
Krogman would purchase a 1986 Kenworth truck from 
Plaintiff Donohue. While this agreement involved the 
sale of goods and not realty, it was clearly taken out of 
Utah's Statute of Frauds based on the doctrines of part 
performance and fully executed contracts. Under the 
terms of the oral agreement, Defendant Krogman was 
required to make payments on the truck totalling 
$17,263.29 together with all repairs, maintenance, 
licensing, insurance, and all other necessities required 
by the truck. (Transcript, pp. 156 & 164). 
Defendant Krogman made all payments, as specified by 
the Plaintiff Donohue, to Mr. Mouille, Plaintiff 
Donohue's agent. (Transcript, pp. 97, 154, 156, & 164). 
In February of 1993, Defendant Krogman paid the pay-off 
total of $5,763.29 to Mr. Mouille, Plaintiff Donohue's 
agent. (Transcript, p. 158). Although Mr. Mouille 
failed to forward that amount to Associates at that time, 
he continued to make monthly payments to Associates. 
(Transcript, pp. 105-106). In July, 1993, Mr. Mouille 
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told Plaintiff Donohue that he was prepared to make the 
last payment on the truck to Associates so that the title 
could be released to Defendant Krogman. (Transcript, pp. 
106-107). At this point, for the first time, Plaintiff 
Donohue told Mr. Mouille that he would not honor the 
contract nor transfer the title to Defendant Krogman. 
(Transcript, pp. 106-107). 
Defendant Krogman fully performed his duties under 
the oral agreement, and therefore, Utah's Statute of 
Frauds has no application to this fully executed 
contract. Even if this Court finds that the oral 
contract between the Plaintiff and the Defendant was not 
fully performed, it must find that Defendant Krogman's 
partial performance effectively took the agreement 
outside Utah's Statute of Frauds. 
First, the oral contract and its terms were clear 
and definite; second, the acts done by the parties in 
performance on the contract were equally clear and 
definite; and third, the acts by Defendant Krogman were 
done in reliance on the contract. Defendant Krogman's 
acts in reliance were such that they would not have been 
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performed had the contract not existed, and the failure 
of Plaintiff Donohue to perform would result in fraud on 
Defendant Krogman, who relied exclusively on the 
existence of the oral contract. Furthermore, under the 
Utah Statute of Frauds, § 25-5-8 U.C.A. (1953), this 
Court has the power to compel the specific performance of 
the oral agreement between the Plaintiff and the 
Defendant due to Defendant Krogman?s part performance. 
Appellant argues that the oral agreement between the 
Plaintiff and the Defendant should constitute a promise 
to answer for the debt of another because the District 
Court found that Defendant Krogman would be responsible 
for making Mr. Mouillefs payments to Associates. This 
assertion is wholly inconsistent with the District 
Court's Findings of Fact which state: "1. Commencing 
December, 1991 through January and February of 1992, 
Plaintiff and Defendants Krogman and Mouille entered into 
an oral agreement whereby Defendant Krogman agreed to pay 
$1,000.00 per month to Associates which represents the 
amount owing Associates by Plaintiff for purchase of the 
Kenworth. (Record, pp. 172-173). 
32 
Neither the Record nor the evidence presented at 
trial suggest that the Defendant contracted to serve as 
a surety for Mr. Mouille. In fact, the testimony 
confirms that the Plaintiff sought a buyer for his 
Kenworth truck. Thus, Plaintiff Donohue entered into an 
agreement with Defendant Krogman to make the payments to 
Associates through Mr. Mouille. Furthermore, the 
Plaintiff contracted separately with Mr. Mouille for the 
$9,500 which Mr. Mouille owed the Plaintiff under an 
earlier agreement.7 
Finally, Appellant argues that the agreement between 
the Plaintiff and the Defendant is barred by Utah's 
Statute of Frauds because it could not have been 
performed within one year. Whether an oral agreement can 
be performed in one year is a question of fact. M&S 
Constr. & Engineering Co. v. Clearfield State Bank, 19 
The District Court found: "6. The oral contract further 
provided that Defendant Mouille would remain liable to 
Plaintiff for $500.00 a month, during the term of the 
contract, which represented the amount of the original lease 
agreement over and above the $1,000.00 owed monthly to 
Associates." (Record, p. 172). 
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Utah 2d 86, 426 P.2d 225 (1967). If an oral agreement 
might be performed within one year, courts will enforce 
that agreement outside of Utah's Statute of Frauds. 
Johnson v. Johnson, 31 Utah 408; 88 P. 230 (1906); 
Zlon's Serv. Corp. v. Danielson, 12 Utah 2d 369, 366 P. 2d 
982 (1961); Thompson v. Whitney, 20 Utah 1, 57 P. 429 
(1910). 
Appellant argues that the agreement did not contain 
a pre-payment provision for payments on the truck. It is 
interesting to note that the agreement also failed to 
mention anything regarding a pre-payment penalty. Thus, 
Defendant Krogman could have paid off the truck any time 
within a year of the contract. Based on the facts of the 
case, the District Court correctly concluded that 
Plaintiff's statute of frauds defense is inapplicable in 
this case. (Record, p. 174). 
III. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED THE 
PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT. 
A. Standard of Review 
The District Court correctly dismissed the 
Plaintiff's Complaint because it found that the parties 
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entered into a valid oral agreement for the sale of the 
Kenworth truck. As previously mentioned, the decision of 
the trial court is entitled to a presumption of validity. 
Oberhansly, 572 P.2d at 1386. Appellate courts will not 
overturn a trial court's factual findings when such 
findings are supported by substantial and competent 
evidence. Cambelt Int'l Corp., 745 P.2d at 1242. 
Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly 
erroneous. UT R. CIV. P. 52(a). 
Although the Plaintiff's Amended Complaint sought 
damages from Defendant Krogman, the District Court found 
that there was no cause of action with respect to 
Plaintiff's claims as embodied within Plaintiff's 
Complaint. (Record, p. 173). The District Court further 
found that Defendant Krogman was the legal owner of the 
Kenworth truck and was entitled to the Kenworth title 
upon payment to the Plaintiff of the sum of $1,125.00. 
(Record, pp. 173-174). The District Court's factual 
findings were based on substantial and competent evidence 
and cannot be overturned unless clearly erroneous. 
B. Proper Dismissal of Plaintiff's Complaint 
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At trial, Defendant Krogman presented substantial 
and competent evidence of the existence of an oral 
agreement between the Plaintiff and the Defendant. The 
District Court found, based on substantial and conclusive 
testimonial evidence given by Defendant Krogman, Mr. 
Mouille, and Mr. Rice, that an oral agreement existed 
between the parties. As mentioned above, substantial 
evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind 
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." 
Johnson-Bowles, 829 P.2d at 107. 
Appellant contends that all reasonable minds would 
conclude that the Plaintiff is entitled to a judgment 
against the Defendant as no oral agreement existed 
between the parties. The District Court properly 
accepted the Defendant's substantial and relevant 
evidence as adequate to support a conclusion of the 
existence of an oral agreement. The District Court, in 
dismissing the Plaintiff's Complaint, conclusively found 
that all reasonable minds could not conclude that the 
Plaintiff proved his case by a preponderance of the 
evidence. Moreover, the substantial and competent 
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evidence presented at trial, proved that an oral contract 
existed between the Plaintiff and the Defendant, under 
which, Defendant Krogman was rightfully entitled to the 
1986 Kenworth truck. 
CONCLUSION 
The District Court properly found that an 
enforceable oral agreement existed between the Plaintiff 
and Defendant. Furthermore, the District Court correctly 
dismissed the Plaintiff's Complaint based on the 
substantial and competent evidence presented at trial. 
The Appellee respectfully requests this Court to affirm 
the District Court's finding that an oral agreement 
existed between the Plaintiff and the Defendant. The 
Appellee respectfully requests his costs on appeal. 
DATED this f *2' day of Septenjbor, 1995. 
*ANpALL L. SKEEN 
:orney for 
Defendant-Appellee 
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before? 
A. No, I'm sure I haven't. 
Q. To this day? I mean is it your 
testimony that this is the first time you've ever 
seen this document, this very minute? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Have you ever been informed that a 
lease agreement existed between Mr. Donohue and 
Mr. Mouille pertaining to the 1986 Kenworth 
tractor? 
A. I didn't know personally there was a 
written agreement. I knew they had some kind of an 
agreement. I didn't know whether it was verbal or 
written. 
Q. When did you first become aware that 
there was some kind of an agreement between 
Mr. Donohue and Mr. Mouille? 
A. On the Kenworth? 
Q . Yes, sir. 
A. Oh, I knew that when I started driving 
for him. Like I say, when I hired on with U.S. 
Load Service, John was around there, and there was 
some talk that this was the guy that owned the 
truck or was selling it to U.S. Load Service or 
whatever. 
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Q. Who told you about this agreement? 
A, I don't know. It might have been 
either Donohue or Mouille, I'm not sure. 
Q. Okay. So as early as February of 
ninety --
A. One. 
Q. One, thank you, you were aware that 
some form of agreement existed between Mr. Donohue 
and Mr. Mouille pertaining to the 1986 Kenworth? 
A. Yes. 
Q. As I understand your testimony, you 
started using the 1986 Kenworth in February of '92 
-- excuse me, January of '92; is that correct? 
A. Correct. 
Q. Now, between the time of February of 
'91 and January of '92, did you ever ask 
Mr. Donohue or Mr. Mouille for a copy of the 
agreement? 
A. No, I never did. 
Q. Did you know whether or not the 
agreement was a lease agreement or a sales 
agreement between Mr. Donohue and Mr. Mouille? 
A. I assumed it was a sales. I'd heard 
that mentioned, that John told me he was buying the 
truck or something. You know, it was really none 
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of my business. I didn't pay much attention. 
Q. Well, did you do anything to 
investigation what type of contractual relationship 
existed between Mr. Donohue and Mr. Mouille 
pertaining to the Kenworth tractor? 
A. No, I didn't. 
Q. I take it there came a point in time 
when there was some discussion about you taking 
over the ownership of the Kenworth tractor? 
A. Correct. 
Q. Is that correct? 
A. (Witness nodded) 
Q. I'd like to find out when was the first 
occasion that this issue arose at all. 
A. It would have been after I quit driving 
for U.S. Load Service in December of '91, between 
then and January 3rd of '92. Because basically I 
was out of a job. 
Q. Did you approach anyone or did someone 
approach you relative to this Kenworth tractor? 
A. I was approached. 
Q. By whom? 
A. Jean Mouille mentioned it originally, 
asked me if I might be interested in taking over 
payments. 
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